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Viewing organizations as open, knowledge-dependent interpretation systems and
building on the knowledge-based view, we develop a theoretical model of knowledge
investments and value creation. By emphasizing the interpretive nature of organiza-
tions and examining knowledge requirements, capabilities, and investments, our
contribution provides a more complete understanding of why some organizations
make certain types of knowledge investments more than others and why these in-
vestments may have positive or negative effects on value creation.
The knowledge-based view of the firm has
grown out of the resource-based tradition (e.g.,
Grant, 1996b) and has rapidly seized a dominant
position among perspectives explaining vari-
ance in firm performance (Eisenhardt & Santos,
2002). This perspective highlights that knowl-
edge is the most strategically significant re-
source of the firm (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Grant,
1996a,b; Kogut & Zander, 1992). In this research
stream there is an implicit message that be-
cause knowledge is key to competitive advan-
tage, “the more knowledge the better.” That is,
scholars often assume that the more managers
invest in knowledge, the greater the benefits
will be for their firms (Eisenhardt & Santos,
2002).
Much knowledge-based research has focused
on contexts where the effects of knowledge are
drawn into high relief, such as managing in an
international context (Kogut & Zander, 1993)
or in a technology-intensive environment (Ranft
& Lord, 2002). These contexts provide a solid
base of initial support for the importance of
knowledge for value creation. In particular, this
research emphasizes the importance of knowl-
edge acquisition (obtaining external knowl-
edge) and knowledge transfer (movement of ex-
isting, internal knowledge), along with the
underlying practices that foster these knowl-
edge capabilities. We define knowledge acqui-
sition capabilities as a firm’s ability to acquire
external information or know-how and knowl-
edge transfer capabilities as a firm’s ability to
transfer internal information or know-how.
Examples of investing in knowledge acquisi-
tion capabilities include investing in research
and development to improve an organization’s
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990)
and hiring market experts to gain information
and know-how about a foreign market to explore
and exploit new market opportunities. Knowl-
edge transfer calls for other practices, such as
investing in improving communication across
departments to develop an organization’s com-
binative capability (Kogut & Zander, 1992) or en-
couraging organization members to familiarize
themselves with knowledge domains of other
members (Foss, 2003).
However, because research has focused on
contexts where the effects of knowledge are
clearly important, little theoretical insight has
been gained into understanding the drivers of
investing in knowledge across organizational
contexts. Such insight is important because or-
ganizations differ in the contexts in which they
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operate and the knowledge investments they
make. For example, organizations vary widely
in the extent of their investment in cross-border
travel to facilitate cross-border knowledge
transfer (Bjo¨rkman, Barner-Rasmussen, & Li,
2004), and in their extent of investment in knowl-
edge management systems to encourage trans-
ferring knowledge across organizational sub-
units (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). Similarly,
organizations differ in the extent they invest in
knowledge acquisition—for example, with re-
spect to underscoring research and develop-
ment (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). Yet it is unclear
how knowledge requirements from organizational
contexts systematically influence knowledge in-
vestments and the extent to which investments
create value.
Some firms may underinvest in knowledge—
for instance, when they invest in knowledge
transfer within well-defined projects but neglect
to invest in knowledge transfer across teams
and projects (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) or across
organizational divisions (Lord & Ranft, 2000). Ni-
dumolu, Subramani, and Aldrich (2001) docu-
mented an example of underinvestment in
knowledge transfer by a market research com-
pany. This firm relied on ad hoc knowledge
transfer from veteran experts to new hires rather
than investments in procedures and systems to
facilitate knowledge transfer between veteran
experts and new hires. The process through
which a new hire sought out necessary knowl-
edge from a veteran expert became so ineffi-
cient and idiosyncratic that it was termed
buffalo chasing.
In other cases organizations seem to overin-
vest in knowledge. For example, firms may in-
vest in knowledge simply by creating “make-
work” jobs. These jobs stress the importance of
knowledge management without considering
the value of that investment in light of specific
knowledge requirements (cf. Brown & Eisen-
hardt, 1997). Some firms make investments in
knowledge management systems and knowl-
edge codification that do not benefit firm perfor-
mance. Haas and Hansen (2005) documented a
case where a consulting firm developed signif-
icant document libraries and expert systems to
transfer knowledge across project teams in the
firm. In many cases, however, these investments
did not enhance value because, for new project
teams, face-to-face discussions were more valu-
able than expending time accessing informa-
tion from the electronic systems (Haas &
Hansen, 2005).
A small but growing body of empirical evidence
lends support for matching knowledge investment
to more general environmental characteristics to
ensure value creation (Haas&Hansen, 2005;Miller
& Shamsie, 1996; Sabherwal & Sabherwal, 2007).
These studies provide initial support that the driv-
ers of knowledge investments vary across firms,
and they point out that investing in knowledge is
not always better. However, despite initial empir-
ical support, theory explaining the drivers and
performance consequences of knowledge invest-
ments across organizational contexts is lacking
(King & Zeithaml, 2003).
We build on prior empirical work and the tradi-
tional position that knowledge creates value to
develop theory clarifying why some organizations
invest more than others in the acquisition and
transfer of knowledge and why knowledge invest-
ments may or may not lead to value creation. We
aim to explain the drivers and performance con-
sequences of knowledge investments by develop-
ing a knowledge investments model that blends
an interpretive systems view (Daft & Weick, 1984)
of organizations with the knowledge-based view
(Grant, 1996b). Consistent with the knowledge-
based view, the heart of our model builds on the
idea that the primary role of firms is acquiring and
transferring knowledge (Grant, 1996b; Kogut &
Zander, 1992). Consistent with the interpretive sys-
tems view, our model builds on the idea that firms
are open systems that face knowledge require-
ments from their environment and tasks (Daft &
Weick, 1984). By combining these two perspec-
tives, we develop our interpretive systems view of
knowledge investments. This view highlights that
gains or losses in value creation depend on mak-
ing knowledge investments that address knowl-
edge requirements.
While both the interpretive systems view and
the knowledge-based view acknowledge limits
on managers’ ability to be fully rational in mak-
ing knowledge investments, knowledge-based
research has tended to overlook these limita-
tions (Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006). We base our
explanations of both under- and overinvestment
in the pursuit of knowledge on managers’
bounded rationality. Accordingly, some of our
explanations are rooted in the path-dependent
nature of knowledge investments, and others
are based on interpretive schemes that discount
or amplify managers’ perceptions of knowledge
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requirements and the usefulness of investing in
knowledge. As such, we also explain how
knowledge investments affect value creation,
both in a positive and a negative way.
In sum, the primary contribution of our theo-
rizing is a more complete explanation of why
some firms invest more in knowledge acquisi-
tion and transfer capabilities than others and
how these investments relate to value creation.
Given the long-touted benefits of knowledge in-
vestments in building competitive advantage
(Grant, 1996b) and the growing anecdotal and
empirical evidence that such investments may
not always pay off (Haas & Hansen, 2005; King &
Zeithaml, 2003), such theorizing helps integrate
an array of seemingly disparate research on
knowledge investments and offers a platform for
future empirical research to isolate and verify
the posited drivers and outcomes of knowledge
investments.
A KNOWLEDGE INVESTMENTS MODEL OF
VALUE CREATION
As a prelude to our development of a knowl-
edge investments model, we clarify several as-
sumptions driven by our intention to combine a
knowledge-based and an interpretive systems
view of organizations. Our first set of assump-
tions, derived from the knowledge-based view,
is that knowledge, in the form of both informa-
tion and know-how, is potentially key to a firm’s
value creation. Information refers to facts and
data that are standardized and can be under-
stood and transmitted with limited cost (Kogut &
Zander, 1992; Winter, 1987). Know-how is action
based, rooted in practice, dependent upon the
practical skills or expertise that is difficult to
articulate and codify, and accumulated over
time through a learning process (Cook & Brown,
1999; Polanyi, 1967; Zander & Kogut, 1995).
Our second set of assumptions rests on the
interpretive systems view that organizations are
open systems that face knowledge requirements
resulting from environmental uncertainty and
equivocality and that these requirements vary
across organizations and time (Daft & Weick,
1984). Uncertainty refers to the lack of informa-
tion to perform organizational tasks (Galbraith,
1973). Gaining more information will reduce that
uncertainty. Equivocality refers to the existence
of multiple and conflicting meanings about sit-
uations (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Weick, 1969). Under
conditions of equivocality, merely gaining more
information may result in even more equivocal-
ity since it can create even more possible mean-
ings. Rather, equivocality is resolved through
developing know-how in order to facilitate judg-
ment and sensemaking of possible meanings
about a situation (Daft & Lengel, 1986). Under
either condition firms must resolve uncertainty
and equivocality in order to function, and they
do so by investing in knowledge. As interpretive
systems, organizations must obtain data, give
them meaning, and take appropriate actions
(Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 1979).
We assume that knowledge exists either
within or outside a firm. As a result, when firms
face knowledge requirements in the form of un-
certainty or equivocality from environmental
and task conditions, we expect them to invest in
the acquisition and transfer of knowledge.
Through these investments organizations not
only use existing knowledge but also may cre-
ate new knowledge to address knowledge re-
quirements. For example, researchers, such as
Nonaka (1994) and Wadhwa and Kotha (2006),
have developed theories about knowledge cre-
ation through the interaction of organization
members and through external venturing.
Further, our model assumes the presence of suf-
ficient slack resources. Like any investment,
knowledge investments require valuable re-
sources. For example, acquiring and transferring
knowledge requires promoting research and de-
velopment (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), developing
intensive communication (e.g., Ghoshal, Korine, &
Szulanski, 1994), and sustaining strong ties among
senders and recipients of knowledge (Hansen,
1999). Firms with limited slack resources, or with
resources in forms not amenable to redeployment
in addressing knowledge requirements, may not
be able to make knowledge investments, despite
their being warranted.
We begin our discussion assuming full ratio-
nality. In doing so we clarify the knowledge in-
vestments firms would make if knowledge re-
quirements were interpreted accurately. However,
this assumption may be violated because deci-
sion makers may experience limitations in their
ability to formulate and solve complex problems
and in their ability to process information (Simon,
1957). Moreover, interpretations of knowledge re-
quirements and appropriate investments are in-
fluenced by core organizational values and be-
liefs (Daft & Weick, 1984), as institutionalized
384 JulyAcademy of Management Review
within organizations’ interpretive schemes (Hin-
ings & Greenwood, 1988). The second half of the
discussion emphasizes the causes and conse-
quences of these limitations.
Taking these assumptions rooted in a combi-
nation of an interpretive systems view and a
knowledge-based view, in the remainder of this
paper we build a knowledge investments model
as depicted in Figure 1. We first turn to the topic
of organizational knowledge requirements.
Knowledge Requirements
As open systems, organizations face knowledge
requirements from the tasks they perform and the
environment with which they interact. These
knowledge requirements are important to con-
sider because they provide an answer to the ques-
tion of why firmsmake certain types of knowledge
investmentsmore or less than others. The levels of
uncertainty and equivocality firms face are impor-
tant contributors to knowledge requirements from
external and internal sources.
External sources of knowledge requirements.
Knowledge-based researchers have empha-
sized the external environment in which firms
face knowledge requirements (King & Zeithaml,
2003). For example, Grant (1996a) points to the
increasingly dynamically competitive environ-
ment as the main reason for the need for knowl-
edge and a firm’s ability to integrate knowledge.
Specific characteristics of the external environ-
ment that influence knowledge requirements
are usually not emphasized or fully explored in
knowledge-based research. The interpretive
systems assumptions underlying our knowledge
investments model, however, indicate that envi-
ronmental dimensions that affect uncertainty
and equivocality should be particularly relevant
to decision makers.
We consider two dimensions—environmental
complexity and dynamism1—as important de-
1 To simplify our presentation, we do not include environ-
mental munificence or subdimensions of environmental dy-
namism in our model. Munificence refers to the availability
of resources in the environment (March & Simon, 1958). It is
important since it may affect many things, such as organi-
zational longevity, but recent research suggests it has lim-
ited direct effects on knowledge acquisition and transfer
(Baker & Nelson, 2005). Moreover, while the dynamism con-
struct has recently been refined into subdimensions of ve-
locity, unpredictability, and ambiguity (Davis, Eisenhardt, &
Bingham, 2008), these subdimensions yield predictions sim-
ilar to those posited here. Therefore, as with our treatment of
organizational task dimensions, our exposition is more ac-
curately viewed as tapping a representative and parsimo-
FIGURE 1
A Model of Knowledge Investments
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terminants of knowledge requirements. Environ-
mental complexity refers to the number of ele-
ments in a firm’s environment that need to be
considered in decision making (Duncan, 1972).
At one end of the dimension, a simple environ-
ment is characterized by few important ele-
ments that are quite similar to one another. Un-
certainty is not great in this environment
because information about the few elements
that play a role is relatively easy to get. In con-
trast, at the other end of the dimension, a com-
plex environment is characterized by many dis-
similar yet related elements. Consequently, in a
complex environment decision makers are more
likely to lack information about certain ele-
ments. For example, expanding firms face in-
creasing environmental complexity as their cus-
tomer bases grow and they become dependent
on more suppliers. As such, firms in complex
environments have greater knowledge require-
ments in the form of a need to resolve uncer-
tainty (Dess & Beard, 1984). Therefore, we pro-
pose the following.
Proposition 1a: The greater the envi-
ronmental complexity, the greater the
knowledge requirements because of
increased uncertainty.
Environmental dynamism refers to the pacing
and magnitude of change in the external envi-
ronment and its degree of predictability or am-
biguity (Duncan, 1972). Dynamism also in-
creases with the degree of interconnections
among environmental elements (Aldrich, 1979).
Whereas in stable environments change is lim-
ited or occurs slowly in a predictable manner, in
dynamic environments change can come from
anywhere, and triggers of change as well as
consequences are more difficult to interpret. In
dynamic environments organization members
may have multiple, ambiguous interpretations
about the best way to face their environment.
For example, industries that are characterized
by intense demand instability, such as the mo-
tion picture industry, commonly show ambiguity
about means-end linkages that call for interpre-
tation from experts, whereas other more stable
industries, such as the gold and silver ore indus-
tries, have relatively clear means-end linkages
(Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995). Firms in tran-
sition economies commonly face equivocality
because a wide variety of changes require in-
terpretation of both new ways of conducting
business and a changing competitive landscape
(Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006). Consequently,
whereas complexity calls for resolving uncer-
tainty, dynamism requires resolving the equiv-
ocality organization members face.
Proposition 1b: The greater the envi-
ronmental dynamism, the greater the
knowledge requirements because of
increased equivocality.
Internal sources of knowledge requirements.
From a knowledge-based view, an organization
can be seen as a bundle of information and
know-how, which needs to be coordinated in
order to complete tasks (Hayek, 1945). Organiza-
tional tasks are the specific processes that a
firm performs to produce its products or deliver
its services. Complex tasks are characterized by
a number of subtasks not easily separated into
independent parts (March & Simon, 1958). A task
becomes more complex as the sheer number of
distinguishing subtasks increases and as more
connections among these subtasks exist (March
& Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967). Task complexity
increases uncertainty among organization
members because it increases the number of
people and units in various parts of the organi-
zation requiring effective coordination and com-
munication of information in order to complete a
task (Galbraith, 1973; Thompson, 1967). For ex-
ample, software development firms include
technical software engineers and customer in-
terface groups (Ranft & Lord, 2002). Technical
software engineers often specialize further and
work on subcomponents of an overall software
system; customer interface groups inform soft-
ware engineers of necessary features to serve
customer needs. This specialization and techno-
logical sophistication results in a complex sys-
tem of interrelated yet fairly distinct task com-
ponents (Ranft & Lord, 2002). Decision makers in
firms characterized by such interdependent
complex tasks face more uncertainty.
Proposition 2a: The greater the task
complexity, the greater the knowl-
edge requirements because of in-
creased uncertainty.
nious set of environmental dimensions, emphasizing those
that affect information and know-how needs.
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Similarly, tasks vary in the degree to which
organization members face equivocality. Task
analyzability is reflected in the extent to which
tasks can be managed by a clear set of proce-
dures as opposed to requiring sophisticated
judgment (Perrow, 1967). Analyzable tasks are
unequivocal. With clear means-ends connec-
tions, little is subject to interpretation, and stan-
dardized routines can be easily applied (Daft &
Weick, 1984). When tasks are analyzable, indi-
viduals can follow specific procedures to re-
solve problems.
In contrast, when analyzability is low, tasks
are difficult to understand, and multiple inter-
pretations of the task composition and appropri-
ate outcomes may exist (King & Ranft, 2001;
Nonaka, 1994). Less analyzable organizational
tasks are subject to causal ambiguity with re-
spect to their performance implications. While
such causal ambiguity may make the tasks
more difficult to imitate by competitors, it also
forms a constraint on task execution because it
taxes organization members, requiring higher-
level cognitive efforts to resolve equivocality
(King & Zeithaml, 2001). For example, multina-
tional companies can achieve competitive ad-
vantage from exploiting the combination of re-
sources from foreign subsidiaries (Gupta &
Govindarajan, 2000), but lower analyzability of
such organizational tasks as a result of cultural
differences between subsidiaries and unique re-
source path dependencies makes them suscep-
tible to multiple interpretations. Therefore, task
analyzability affects the equivocality decision
makers face.
Proposition 2b: The lower the task
analyzability, the greater the knowl-
edge requirements because of in-
creased equivocality.
Knowledge Investments Under Conditions of
Full Rationality
Based on our previous discussion, decision
makers consider their tasks and environment,
interpret the uncertainty and equivocality they
face, and, consequently, determine what re-
sources to invest in and what actions to take
(Daft & Weick, 1984; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia,
1993). Uncertainty and equivocality have very
different consequences for both the type and
magnitude of knowledge investments firms
make (summarized in Table 1). To specify the
drivers of investments rooted in knowledge re-
quirements, we turn to a discussion of two gen-
eral types of knowledge capabilities in which
firms may invest: knowledge acquisition and
knowledge transfer. Knowledge acquisition ca-
pabilities refer to a firm’s ability to acquire ex-
ternal knowledge (information or know-how),
whereas knowledge transfer capabilities refer
to a firm’s ability to transfer internal knowledge
(information or know-how).
Knowledge investments to resolve external
knowledge requirements. Simply put, the greater
the environmental uncertainty, the greater the
need for information (Galbraith, 1973, 1977; March
& Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967) and the larger the
knowledge investments needed to optimize infor-
mation acquisition. Environmental complexity
that influences the need to resolve external
sources of uncertainty can be dealt with through
investing in activities that foster the acquisition of
information about external sources. For example,
firms with many different types of customers may
face uncertainty about the manner in which to
approach customers and about which unique
needs to fulfill. To resolve such uncertainty, firms
need to acquire information by investing in mar-
ket research, databases of customer characteris-
tics, or systems that facilitate collecting such in-
formation.
Raff (2000) documented this in his study of
Border’s. As Border’s grew, the book superstore
invested in and continuously upgraded its in-
formation systems in order to acquire detailed
data on its customers and to make that informa-
tion available to sellers and buyers. As Border’s
customer base expanded, the firm invested in
increasingly sophisticated inventory software
that allowed it to “incorporate increasingly sub-
tle decision support information and increas-
ingly subtle characteristics of what individual
books . . . were like” (Raff, 2000: 1046). Similarly,
Kim, Umanath, and Kim (2006) explain that firms
in supply chains may invest in electronic data-
bases to acquire information from supply chain
partners in response to demand uncertainty.
Proposition 3a: The greater the envi-
ronmental uncertainty, the more or-
ganizational decision makers will in-
vest in information acquisition.
Unlike uncertainty, equivocality cannot be re-
solved by acquiring more information. In fact,
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accumulating more information might actually
increase the potential for conflicting interpreta-
tions and contribute to increasing equivocality
(Daft & Lengel, 1986). Rather, equivocality can be
resolved through acquiring richer know-how
about a situation in order to make sense of it
(Weick, 1995). Know-how facilitates judgment
and helps firms select the best among conflict-
ing interpretations. Thus, while uncertainty re-
quires more information, equivocality requires
know-how (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Daft & Weick,
1984). And, as interpretive systems, firms that
perceive equivocality will make knowledge in-
vestments to attempt to resolve this.
When the environment is dynamic, to make
sense of the continuously changing nature of
conducting business, firms need to acquire new
know-how about the environment (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1989; Grant, 1996a; Lane et al., 2006).
Because of the time-intensive, path-dependent
nature of developing know-how internally, some
of this know-how acquisition may occur by mak-
ing transactions in the market (Dierickx & Cool,
1989; Zollo & Winter, 2002). For example, Brown
and Eisenhardt (1997) describe how successful
firms in the highly dynamic computer industry
hired marketing futurists and technology gu-
rus to make sense of the fast-changing envi-
ronment and to probe into the future. Alterna-
tively, a firm may pursue know-how through
alliances or acquisitions (Coff, 1999; Hamel,
1991; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Lane et al., 2006).
Ranft and Lord (2002) describe an acquisition
of a small biotech firm specializing in combi-
natorial chemistry drug screening techniques.
This acquisition allowed a large pharmaceutical
TABLE 1
Knowledge Requirements As Triggers of Knowledge Investments
Requirements Capabilities Investments Exemplars
External uncertainty Information
acquisition
Investments in information
retrieval systems,
databases
Firms in supply chains that invest in electronic
databases to acquire information from
supply chain partners in response to demand
uncertainty (Kim, Umanath, & Kim, 2006)
Book superstores that invest in information
retrieval systems to collect customer data
(Raff, 2000)
External equivocality Know-how
acquisition
Investments in absorptive
capacity, research and
development, attracting
experts in the field,
acquisition of centers of
expertise, learning
alliances
Firms in transition economies that invest in the
acquisition of operating know-how from
distant sources to reflect the new demands
of their changing environment (Kriauciunas
& Kale, 2006)
Pharmaceutical companies that make
investments to gain access to biotech know-
how in response to a turbulent environment
(Schweizer, 2005)
MNCs that make knowledge-seeking
investments in foreign affiliates with highly
skilled employees (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005)
Internal uncertainty Information
transfer
Investments in information
and communication
systems, common access
databases
Hospitals that invest in clinical information
systems for the collection and access of
patient records (Lapointe & Rivard, 2007)
IT organizations that document task
responsibilities in a database to reduce
search time for “who knows what and
where” (Vaast & Levina, 2006)
Internal equivocality Know-how
transfer
Investments in combinative
capability, face-to-face
meetings, management
transfer, key employee
transfer, integrative
teams
Acquirers that invest in cross-border visits to
transfer technological know-how to newly
acquired foreign units (Bresman, Birkinshaw,
& Nobel, 1999)
Multinational companies that invest in rich
transmission channels among subsidiaries to
transfer know-how among subsidiaries
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000)
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firm to immediately obtain the know-how to
screenmultiple chemical compounds for potential
commercial use at an exponential rate compared
to traditional pharmaceutical screening methods.
Consequently, for some firms, investing in pro-
cesses that facilitate effective hiring, acquisitions,
or alliances to acquire know-how is critical.
Alternatively, in response to external sources
of equivocality, firms acquire know-how by
building this capability internally (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990; Jansen, Van den Bosch, & Vol-
berda, 2005). Firms may make initial invest-
ments into research and development, labs, peo-
ple, and equipment with the intent that, over
time, know-how will be built (Ahuja, Coff, & Lee,
2005). This type of development builds on the
path-dependent nature of dynamic capabilities
in an organizational context with sustained in-
vestment over time to develop absorptive capac-
ity. With absorptive capacity, organization
members better recognize the value of new, ex-
ternal knowledge; assimilate this knowledge;
and may apply it to commercial ends (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990).
Because the level of equivocality organizational
decision makers experience varies across envi-
ronments, investments in know-how acquisition
will likely vary as well. For example, some firms
are more willing to invest in developing absorp-
tive capacity because they perceive a need for
learning in the environment (Cohen & Levinthal,
1989). Pharmaceutical companies may make
more knowledge investments to gain access to
know-how in response to a turbulent environ-
ment caused by the increasing influence of bio-
technology over the industry (Schweizer, 2005).
Or a changing global environment may lead
certain firms in transition economies to invest in
the acquisition of operating know-how from dis-
tant sources in the West (Kriauciunas & Kale,
2006), while MNCs may make knowledge-
seeking investments into foreign affiliates with
highly skilled employees (Nachum & Zaheer,
2005). Know-how acquisition, then, is pursued
under conditions of equivocality through a vari-
ety of means, and, in general, we expect the
following.
Proposition 3b: The greater the envi-
ronmental equivocality, the more or-
ganizational decision makers will in-
vest in know-how acquisition.
Knowledge investments to resolve internal
knowledge requirements. Tasks can be a source
of uncertainty when complexity requires inter-
connections between people and units. For ex-
ample, some diversified financial institutions
face the task of coordinating activities among
different banking institutions, as well as be-
tween banking and insurance divisions, which
creates considerable uncertainty between units
and people. Firms can resolve such uncertainty
by investing in intricate information or commu-
nication systems and databases that facilitate
the transfer of information (Galbraith, 1977). Al-
ternatively, firms can invest in common access
databases, which deal with internal sources of
uncertainty through coordinating and standard-
izing activities as well as facilitating communi-
cation (Argyris, 1999). For example, a hospital
may invest in clinical information systems for
the collection and access of patient records
(Lapointe & Rivard, 2007), or an IT organization
may invest in a database that documents task
responsibilities to facilitate the search for who
knows what and where (Vaast & Levina, 2006).
As interpretive systems, organizations will de-
termine their internal sources of uncertainty and
interpret the types of investments in information
systems needed to deal with these knowledge
requirements.
Proposition 4a: The greater the task
uncertainty, the more organizational
decision makers will invest in infor-
mation transfer.
Alternatively, decision makers will assess in-
ternal sources of equivocality and determine
their firms’ knowledge investments. Through
transferring know-how, organizations and
groups of organization members can combine
and recombine knowledge in order to deal with
task equivocality (Argote, 1999). While the pres-
ence of absorptive capacity facilitates the abil-
ity both to recognize the value of related exter-
nal knowledge and to use it for commercial
purposes (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), investments
in the development of combinative capability
are necessary to foster know-how transfer.
Combinative capability refers to the capacity
“to generate new applications from existing
knowledge” (Kogut & Zander, 1993: 391). The de-
velopment of combinative capability depends
on the ability of a firm to create a social com-
munity that is rooted in action (Brown & Duguid,
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1991; Cook & Brown, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992).
Firms can achieve this by investing in internal
social networks through organizing meetings,
conducting training programs, transferring
managers and specialists across subsidiaries,
investing in coffee bars with the explicit pur-
pose of encouraging informal connections and
problem solving among product developers, or
investing in activities that facilitate the devel-
opment of a general atmosphere that stimulates
knowledge combination and promotes the diffu-
sion of know-how (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997;
Jansen et al., 2005; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Thus,
emerging needs to resolve internal sources of
equivocality trigger investments in know-how
transfer.
Proposition 4b: The greater the task
equivocality, the more organizational
decision makers will invest in know-
how transfer.
Knowledge Investments Under Conditions of
Bounded Rationality
The preceding propositions rest on an inter-
pretive systems view that firms face knowledge
requirements in the form of uncertainty and
equivocality and that decision makers will re-
spond to make knowledge investments in capa-
bilities that address this uncertainty and equiv-
ocality. We have assumed that decision makers
are fully rational in their efforts to interpret
these knowledge requirements and in their se-
lection of knowledge investments. In practice,
however, this assumption of full rationality is
often violated (Cyert & March, 1963; Perrow, 1984;
Spender, 2003; Todorova & Durisin, 2007).
Critical limitations to objective assessment of
knowledge requirements occur because sources
of uncertainty and equivocality are identified
and interpreted by decision makers through
core organizational values and beliefs (Daft &
Weick, 1984), as institutionalized within an orga-
nization’s interpretative scheme (Hinings &
Greenwood, 1988). Hinings and Greenwood
(1988) described an interpretive scheme as cap-
turing the core ideas, values, and beliefs re-
flected in and reproduced by organizations’ ex-
isting structures and systems. Interpretive
schemes shape decision makers’ perceptions of
knowledge requirements, the value of knowl-
edge investments, and the acceptable forms of
investments (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988;
Todorova & Durisin, 2007). Therefore, here we
view interpretive schemes as important filters of
knowledge requirements, the adequacy of the
available information and know-how in meeting
those needs, the appropriate types and levels of
knowledge investments, and the merits of these
investments made in knowledge-dependent in-
terpretive systems.
Belief structures about knowledge invest-
ments embodied in interpretive schemes can
come from an organization’s distinctive institu-
tionalized character (Selznick, 1984), heavily
conditioned by its own history (Amis, Slack, &
Hinings, 2004; Weick, 1995). Therefore, even for
firms facing similar knowledge requirements,
interpretive schemes act as a filter of the per-
ceptions of knowledge requirements, the value
of available information and know-how, and the
value of knowledge investments due to the dif-
ferences between firms in their history-condi-
tioned institutionalized beliefs and practices.
Partly, a firm’s interpretive scheme is devel-
oped through prior knowledge investments.
Knowledge investments lead to knowledge out-
put, which, in turn, can influence a firm’s inter-
pretive scheme (cf. Lane et al., 2006). Organiza-
tional capabilities are said to have a distinct life
cycle of development (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). In
the early stages of capability development, in-
vestment has a greater impact on generating
the unique nature of the capability (Ahuja &
Katila, 2004). For example, through related in-
vestments in acquiring knowledge, absorptive
capacity begets more absorptive capacity
(Zahra & George, 2002). As the capability ma-
tures, however, investment has a sustaining and
refining effect rather than a developing effect
(Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). While this process en-
riches the development of some capabilities, it
also may narrow the range of investments to
develop a limited set of knowledge capabilities
(Leonard-Barton, 1992) and makes it increasingly
difficult to modify investment strategies to ac-
quire or transfer knowledge from alternative ar-
eas. Similarly, investments in building strong
ties among organization members over time
may constrain the acquisition of new knowledge
by narrowing the firm’s search processes
(Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). Because systems,
structures, cultures, people, and processes are,
to some degree, inert, and because redirecting
knowledge investments may be difficult, prior
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investments influence the interpretive scheme
used by organizational decision makers. As
such, some decision makers may not identify the
need to make changes in investments, or, even
when they do recognize the need for capability
change, forces within the firm may prevent ac-
tion (Gilbert, 2005; Levinthal & March, 1993).
Several researchers (e.g., Foss, 2003; Kjær-
gaard & Kautz, 2008) have recounted the history
of Oticon, the world’s largest hearing aid com-
pany, which illustrates the tenacity of interpre-
tive schemes. In the early 1990s Oticon became
known as a prototypical “spaghetti organiza-
tion,” which involved a flat structure that
heavily emphasized knowledge sharing through
competence centers. Organization members at
the operational level constantly invested time
and resources into developing new knowledge
management initiatives, and they stressed
the importance of such investments. By the late
1990s, top management identified considerable
costs involved with the spaghetti organization
and became more hesitant to support knowl-
edge management initiatives (Kjærgaard &
Kautz, 2008). However, organization members
kept investing time and resources to introduce
new ideas, proposals, and experiments with in-
formation systems solutions, even after previous
projects were not supported.
Thus, prior knowledge investments affect not
only what organizations are good at but, from an
interpretive systems perspective, what decision
makers come to believe their firms are, or need
to be, good at. We state this in a formal propo-
sition.
Proposition 5: Prior knowledge invest-
ments shape interpretive schemes of
organizational decision makers to fa-
vor similar knowledge investments.
It is too simplistic to view values about knowl-
edge investments as idiosyncratic to each orga-
nization, however. Belief structures about
knowledge investments embodied in interpre-
tive schemes come not only from an organiza-
tion’s distinctive institutionalized character and
prior knowledge investments but also from ex-
ternal institutional pressures that have a ho-
mogenizing effect on belief structures about
knowledge investments across organizations in
the same industry or organizational field.
Knowledge investments occur in a social con-
text where accepted practices are likely to be
mimicked by others (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). That is, decision makers
conform to social conventions of what is consid-
ered effective management to gain legitimacy
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
External institutional pressures may lead to
overly optimistic belief structures and misdi-
rected investments in knowledge resources. For
example, since the 1990s, knowledge manage-
ment has gained immense popularity in the ac-
ademic and popular press. Popular bestsellers
such as Senge’s (1990) The Fifth Discipline have
emphasized the importance of making knowl-
edge investments, and success stories of knowl-
edge management systems used by consulting
firms such as Accenture and Ernst & Young have
further fueled this interest in making knowledge
investments. These popularized ideas of knowl-
edge management likely have instilled institu-
tionalized beliefs and practices that boost new
knowledge investments, regardless of any gaps
between knowledge requirements and avail-
able information and know-how in at least
some, and possibly many, firms (cf. Abrahamson
& Fombrun, 1994).
Institutional pressures underlying legitimacy
can endanger firms because they make it diffi-
cult for decision makers to see other, potentially
better, alternatives to business practices. Ulti-
mately, the process of institutionalization may
lead to a single dominant view that is widely
held across firms (McKinley, Zhao, & Rust, 2000).
An illustration of such a practice can be seen in
the airline industry. For several years many air-
lines invested in developing and utilizing a
massive data and reservation system, citing
competitive disadvantage for those airlines not
having access to the centralized system. Yet the
airline with the highest and most consistent
profitability in the industry did not participate
in the centralized reservation system at all
(Freiberg & Freiberg, 1996). The airline industry
saw few exceptions to institutional pressures
and industry norms, driven by idiosyncratic, dis-
tinctive history-dependent values in some orga-
nizations. We expect the homogenizing effects of
institutional pressures on belief structures em-
bodied in interpretive schemes to account for
many of the observed similarities in the valued
knowledge investments across organizations in
industries, such as the airline industry.
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Proposition 6: The more external insti-
tutional pressures emphasize certain
types of knowledge investments, the
more these types of knowledge invest-
ments are valued in the interpretive
schemes of organizational decision
makers.
Thus, prior knowledge investments and exter-
nal institutional pressures shape the interpre-
tive schemes of organizational decision makers.
These interpretive schemes, in turn, will likely
influence and distort the extent to which per-
ceived knowledge requirements lead to knowl-
edge investments. Interpretive schemes may
lead to overinvestment or misapplied invest-
ments in favored knowledge capabilities, re-
gardless of any rational assessment of the gaps
between knowledge requirements and capabil-
ities. Norms and beliefs about knowledge in-
vestments shared among decision makers may
emphasize the benefits of making certain in-
vestments in knowledge and may ignore or
downplay the associated costs. For example, in
a study of management consulting firms, Haas
and Hansen (2005) illustrated that the organiza-
tional emphasis on investing in knowledge-
sharing systems and communications could, in
fact, be detrimental to the success of obtaining
new consulting projects. They explained that
these missteps might occur because team mem-
bers feel “obliged to go through the motions of
consulting all the available knowledge sources
because of formal incentives to utilize such re-
sources, as well as an informal but pervasive
norm of knowledge sharing in the firm” (Haas &
Hansen, 2005: 19).
Interpretive schemes may also lead to under-
investment in knowledge resources—in general
or in specific areas. Perhaps because of early
failed attempts to acquire or transfer knowl-
edge, some interpretive schemes may empha-
size the costs or barriers to effective knowledge
investments or to particular types of knowledge
investments, while downplaying their potential
benefits. Or it may be that innovative invest-
ments of any kind, such as those associated with
knowledge, may be inconsistent with interpre-
tive schemes that emphasize efficiency over in-
novation (cf. Rosner, 1968). Since knowledge in-
vestments raise costs and may cause temporary
inefficiencies, decision makers who are more
efficiency oriented may discourage, delay, or
avoid making such knowledge investments. Re-
gardless of the source of the values and beliefs
about knowledge investments embodied in an
interpretative scheme, these values will system-
atically affect the actual knowledge invest-
ments made by decision makers.
Proposition 7: Interpretive schemes
moderate the extent to which knowl-
edge requirements lead to knowledge
investments such that (a) interpretive
schemes where knowledge invest-
ments are highly valued will amplify
these types of knowledge investments,
regardless of knowledge require-
ments, and (b) interpretive schemes
where knowledge investments are not
valued will depress these types of
knowledge investments, regardless of
knowledge requirements.
IMPLICATIONS FOR VALUE CREATION
The preceding propositions explain that vari-
ations in knowledge investments among orga-
nizations are rooted in knowledge requirements
and in the interpretations of these requirements.
The interpretive systems view of knowledge in-
vestments also has implications for value cre-
ation. Firms can reap benefits from knowledge
investments when the investments resolve un-
certainty and equivocality. When uncertainty or
equivocality is not adequately addressed by or-
ganizational decision makers, firms cannot
function effectively and value will be destroyed.
For illustrative purposes, as depicted in Figure
2, we can conceptualize four qualitatively differ-
ent conditions, based on different ways in which
knowledge investments and requirements are
matched or mismatched, each with rather differ-
FIGURE 2
Four Knowledge Investment Conditions
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ent antecedents, costs, and performance out-
comes. We label these conditions simple knowl-
edge fit, complex knowledge fit, knowledge
deficit, and knowledge overreliance.
Simple knowledge fit occurs when organiza-
tions make few knowledge investments when
facing limited knowledge requirements. An or-
ganization in a stable and simple environment
with tasks that show few interdependencies
among organization members can reap the
greatest benefits from relatively limited knowl-
edge investments. In this context the greatest
benefits from knowledge capabilities stem from
investments in relatively simple infrastructures.
Such firms should focus on making nonknowl-
edge investments, such as investments in land,
equipment, and facilities, which may accrue
market power or market size, rather than infor-
mation and know-how (cf. Miller & Shamsie,
1996). Simple fit situations are characterized by
low costs associated with knowledge invest-
ments and positive returns from nonknowledge
investments.
The relationship between knowledge invest-
ments and value creation is particularly strong
when knowledge requirements are high. The
need for information and the need for know-how
become more important when organizations
face more uncertainty and equivocality (Daft &
Lengel, 1986; Galbraith, 1977). Organizations
that show a complex knowledge fit match high
knowledge requirements with requisite knowl-
edge investments. Considering our discussion
of knowledge requirements, such complex
knowledge fit can take a variety of forms, de-
pending on the knowledge requirements orga-
nizations face. For example, when firms face a
complex and dynamic environment, it becomes
more important for them to acquire the informa-
tion and know-how to be innovative, develop
new products, and shorten project completion
times (Hansen, 1999; Hoopes & Postrel, 1999). Un-
der these conditions it is important for firms to
make considerable investments in information
systems and in developing absorptive capacity
so as to excel in information and know-how ac-
quisition. Bearing long-run costs associated
with knowledge investments is acceptable be-
cause improving knowledge acquisition capa-
bilities creates the important benefits of resolv-
ing the external uncertainty and equivocality
encountered in complex and dynamic environ-
ments (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989).
Complex knowledge fit also is indicative of
organizations that invest in information and
know-how transfer when they face internal un-
certainty and equivocality. For example, a geo-
graphically dispersed organization that per-
forms tasks that are difficult to analyze and
highly interdependent can reach a complex
knowledge fit when decision makers invest in
the development of strong information sharing
systems and combinative capabilities through
intricate networks of organization members and
subunits (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Kogut &
Zander, 1993). Similarly, there is a complex
knowledge fit when firms are able to develop
strong ties and to use rich communication me-
dia during the implementation of high-technol-
ogy acquisitions that are characterized by con-
siderable internal equivocality (Ranft & Lord,
2002).
Organizational decision makers who do not
make investments in knowledge acquisition or
transfer while their organizations face knowl-
edge requirements fall prey to conditions of
knowledge deficit. In this underinvestment situ-
ation the costs associated with knowledge in-
vestments may be low, but the opportunity costs
result in a subpar performance situation. The
consequences of this condition have been the
focus of much conceptual and empirical re-
search. Several studies have emphasized orga-
nizations that show a lack of investments in
know-how transfer when there is a high need to
resolve internal equivocality—for example, Szu-
lanski’s (1996) findings indicate that the transfer
of best practices is likely to be hindered se-
verely when decision makers do not invest in
developing the relationships between knowl-
edge senders and recipients. Or, when firms
face equivocality, they may invest in codifica-
tion to facilitate information acquisition and
transfer but neglect to invest in acquiring and
transferring know-how to be able to interpret
necessary adaptations to prior solutions. Haas
and Hansen (2005) have shown that this can be
particularly harmful in highly competitive envi-
ronments that call for unique interpretations to
foster differentiation from competition.
The knowledge investments model of value
creation proposed here suggests that it is the
organizational decision makers’ interpretive
schemes that deter knowledge investments, de-
spite their importance as dictated by the knowl-
edge requirements the decision makers’ organi-
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zations face. A knowledge deficit situation may
be rooted in reducing costs of investments in
existing capabilities (King & Tucci, 2002). Rather
than investing in new capabilities with greater
or less well-known costs, organizations may
choose to reinvest in readily available capabil-
ities. While the costs associated with develop-
ing existing capabilities may be reduced over
time (Zahra & George, 2002), the increasingly
narrow concentration can create significant op-
portunity costs associated with new capabili-
ties. Similarly, prior knowledge investments in
serving existing customer groups can prevent
firms from noticing knowledge requirements as-
sociated with new customer segments (Todorova
& Durisin, 2007). Such organizations face a
knowledge deficit when changing knowledge
requirements call for investments in novel
knowledge capabilities.
Some decision makers, because of their orga-
nizations’ interpretive schemes, will make sig-
nificant knowledge investments even though
their organizations do not face the requisite
knowledge requirements. An organization that
finds itself in a knowledge overreliance state
overinvests capital, personnel, and time in man-
aging knowledge relative to knowledge require-
ments. Such overinvestments may stem from in-
stitutionally embedded interpretive schemes
valuing investing in knowledge capabilities for
their own sake, without clear goals for efficiency
or effectiveness. Other overinvestments may be
caused by the path-dependent nature of the
competency-building process itself.
Decision makers who overinvest in building
knowledge capabilities face opportunity costs
in the form of foregone opportunities to invest in
alternative options, such as building a new
plant or reducing debt. In addition, knowledge
overreliance may be consequential because
considerable costs can be associated with
knowledge investments. Teece (1977) conducted
a rare direct test of costs associated with man-
aging knowledge. He referred to resource costs
of knowledge transfer as those costs related to
transmission and absorption of know-how. In a
study of international transfers of technological
know-how, he found that these resource costs
made up a considerable portion of the total
project costs, ranging from 2.25 percent to 59
percent, with a mean of 19.16 percent. More re-
cent research has emphasized less direct costs
of investing in knowledge and has shown that
investments in research and development or in-
formation systems may result in unexpected
costs associated with insider trading (Ahuja et
al., 2005), information overload for decision mak-
ers (Hansen & Haas, 2001), or inappropriate use
of information (Haas & Hansen, 2005). Despite
Teece’s early work, research examining the rel-
ative benefits and costs of knowledge invest-
ment is in its very early stages. However, Haas
and Hansen (2005) have provided initial evi-
dence that there may be knowledge overreli-
ance situations in which costs outweigh bene-
fits of knowledge investments.
Some organizations may simultaneously fall
into a knowledge deficit situation in one knowl-
edge domain while being overreliant in another
knowledge domain. Partly, such a situation is
reflected in March’s (1991) description of organi-
zations that do not balance their exploration
and exploitation of knowledge. For example, un-
der conditions of decreasing external equivocal-
ity and increasing internal equivocality, deci-
sion makers may invest too much in developing
the capability to acquire know-how and too little
in the capability to transfer know-how within
the organization. Such organizations are at once
prone to knowledge deficit and knowledge over-
reliance and are likely to face opportunity costs
associated with a lack of know-how transfer,
while at the same time facing redundant costs
associated with know-how acquisition. Levitt
and March’s (1988) discussion of competency
traps also suggests simultaneous knowledge
overreliance and knowledge deficit. Organiza-
tional decision makers who invest in the devel-
opment of a competency and keep making in-
vestments to improve and exploit it may become
overly reliant on this competency and unable to
reap benefits from other more valuable opportu-
nities that may emerge for which new knowl-
edge capabilities are necessary.
Nag, Corley, and Gioia (2007) offer an example
of a firm that can be classified in this situation.
They describe the story of Tekmar (a pseu-
donym), a high-tech organization that attempted
to transform from a pure research and develop-
ment organization into a market-oriented orga-
nization by “grafting” new, nontechnological
knowledge. This transformation created a sud-
den increase in knowledge requirements in the
form of external equivocality of the market and
a diminution in knowledge requirements of in-
ternal equivocality that characterized the pure
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research and development work. While top man-
agement identified the new knowledge require-
ments the organization faced, organization
members persisted in viewing the firm as a pure
research and development company and dis-
counted the new need to invest in acquiring
market knowledge.
Kor and Leblebici (2005) also describe such a
situation when they explain how partners of
several law firms used associates to leverage
their expertise to deal with the knowledge re-
quirements the firms faced. Some law firms in-
vested in developing information acquisition
and transfer capabilities through lateral hiring.
While this helped the firms build knowledge
bases and helped them grow, excessive use of
partner leveraging and lateral hiring of associ-
ates made it impossible for partners to effec-
tively coach associates, making it more difficult
to respond to new and increasing demands of
internal and external equivocality. As a result,
the law firms could not effectively acquire and
transfer the necessary know-how to develop a
competitive advantage, and value was de-
stroyed.
Thus, knowledge matches lead to value cre-
ation, while mismatches lead to value destruc-
tion. Under simple knowledge fit conditions,
firms that face limited uncertainty and equivo-
cality create value when they make nonknowl-
edge investments. Firms that are characterized
by complex knowledge fit situations create
value when they face knowledge requirements
(external/internal uncertainty/equivocality) that
are matched by requisite knowledge invest-
ments (acquisition/transfer of information/know-
how). Under knowledge deficit conditions, orga-
nizations face opportunity costs, because a lack
of investments limits the ability to resolve
equivocality or uncertainty. Finally, knowledge
overreliance conditions indicate large invest-
ments in developing knowledge capabilities
that do not match a firm’s knowledge require-
ments; these knowledge investments then may
only function as redundant costs, such as the
direct costs related to know-how transmission
and absorption stressed by Teece (1977) or the
indirect costs associated with insider trading,
information overload, and inappropriate use of
information stressed in previous research.
Proposition 8: The extent to which
knowledge investments lead to value
creation is positively related to the ex-
tent to which they match knowledge
requirements.
DISCUSSION
Our purpose in this paper was to blend an
interpretive systems view with the knowledge-
based view of the firm in order to develop a
more complete understanding of why some or-
ganizations make certain types of knowledge
investments more than others and why those
investments may have both positive and nega-
tive effects on value creation. In doing so we
developed a model of knowledge investments
grounded in a knowledge-dependent, interpre-
tive systems view of organizations. Our model
identifies important drivers of knowledge in-
vestments, details the interpretive nature of as-
sessing knowledge requirements and building
knowledge capabilities, and examines the im-
plications for value creation. In the end, we hope
we have both offered a useful way of under-
standing why some firms invest more in knowl-
edge than others and highlighted the difficulties
in having these knowledge investments lead to
value creation.
Our theorizing places existing research in a
more complete framework for understanding the
development of knowledge capabilities. Most of
the research to date has focused on how knowl-
edge investments do and do not lead to knowl-
edge capabilities (e.g., Hoopes & Postrel, 1999;
Szulanski, 1996), or it has clarified the benefits of
knowledge capabilities for value creation (e.g.,
Grant, 1996b; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Our model
helps to show that knowledge investments are
motivated by a complex mix of environmental
and task factors interpreted by organizational
decision makers. Not all firms will want or need
to invest in knowledge capabilities equally. Nor
is it likely that firms will benefit equally from
their knowledge investments. In fact, given the
range of factors that filter managers’ assess-
ments of knowledge requirements and the util-
ity of various knowledge investments, it is unre-
alistic to expect that even the most omniscient of
decision makers will make optimal knowledge
investments that consistently improve value
creation.
The model developed here also helps to ex-
plain performance results observed in prior re-
search. As Miller and Shamsie (1996) docu-
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mented, our theorizing predicts very different
performance benefits of knowledge investments
in industries where knowledge requirements
are extremely high and low. Similarly, Haas and
Hansen’s (2005) findings documenting the costs
of knowledge investments and their dysfunc-
tional performance effects are consistent with
the predictions of our model. The costs of knowl-
edge investments, including the opportunity
costs, can get very high for firms, particularly in
contexts that provide little need for these knowl-
edge investments. The model also further clari-
fies the performance outcomes of knowledge in-
vestments by predicting different types of
matches and mismatches with knowledge
requirements.
By identifying several variables and relation-
ships currently underrepresented in the litera-
ture, we also offer a roadmap for future theoriz-
ing and empirical research on knowledge
capabilities. Clearly, to balance the benefits of
knowledge investments, future research will
need to explicitly consider the costs. As knowl-
edge investments become a greater part of over-
all investments, firms face increasingly more
direct and indirect costs associated with these
investments (Jacobson & Prusak, 2006; Teece,
1977). Future research that can identify different
types of costs associated with knowledge in-
vestments will be important to further under-
stand the consequences of knowledge deficit
and knowledge overreliance situations.
Also, drivers of knowledge investments would
benefit from empirical testing. For example, it
may be useful for future research to document
the relative frequency of interpretive schemes
having amplifying, as opposed to dampening,
effects on knowledge investments and how the
processes may be different at various levels or
types of gaps between knowledge requirements
and current capabilities. The importance of
matching knowledge investments with require-
ments may depend on the particular sources of
uncertainty and equivocality.
Apart from interpretive schemes, there may be
other important factors that distort knowledge
investments. A particularly relevant factor here
might be the organizational politics through
which powerful decision makers manipulate
and control important information channels (Ar-
gote, McEvily, & Reagans, 2003). For example,
Pettigrew (1973) described how a manager re-
stricted information flows to other managers
and the board of directors. Even when organiza-
tions make knowledge investments, managers’
self-interest may prevent optimization of these
investments (cf. Haas, 2006). When decision
makers do share a common interest in organi-
zational value creation, they might differ in how
they perceive they can reach this value cre-
ation—for example, because of the position they
hold in the organization (Cyert & March, 1963).
An executive of an innovative trucking company
recently recounted to one of the authors an ex-
ample where top management introduced new
SAP business intelligence software that re-
quired substantial input from the best engi-
neers. However, because the head of engineer-
ing was pressed for productivity and was in
particular need of the best engineers, he sent his
subpar engineers to SAP development meetings.
The result was increased costs in the form of
system expenses, system update expenses, con-
sulting expenses, and a subpar intelligence sys-
tem that was not utilized.
Future research can also concentrate on the
ways in which firms recover from mismatch sit-
uations. To escape a knowledge overreliance
situation, organizations may need to make in-
vestments in actively dissolving capabilities or
in building a platform of options (Martin de Ho-
lan & Phillips, 2004). Through dissolving obso-
lete capabilities, firms can regain the flexibility
to make smarter investments in knowledge ca-
pabilities that better match knowledge require-
ments (George, 2005). Alternatively, by investing
in multiple capabilities and building a platform
of options, managerial myopia is minimized and
flexibility for future investment increased. To
recuperate from a knowledge deficit situation,
decision makers will need to stress knowledge
investments in order to enhance knowledge ac-
quisition and transfer. In general, recovering
from knowledge mismatches requires better un-
derstanding how decision makers can change
their deep-rooted interpretive schemes of knowl-
edge requirements and knowledge capabilities.
In our theorizing we have assumed the impor-
tance of arriving at a match between knowledge
requirements and knowledge capabilities. We
have not addressed the role of timing and
chance in this process. Firms that delay arriving
at a match may occasionally be better off.
Burgelman (1994) explained that strategic ne-
glect may in some instances be fortuitously ben-
eficial. However, such neglect can just as easily
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lead to misfortune. While the roles of timing and
chance fall outside the scope of the theory we
have put forth in this paper, we call for future
research to explore these factors further.
We have also limited the scope of this paper
to knowledge requirements faced by single
business units. Our theory does not directly con-
sider the multidivisional organization. However,
future theorizing can address the knowledge re-
quirements in the context of multidivisional or-
ganizational structures. For example, it will be
important to consider how top management
teams of multidivisional organizations manage
knowledge requirements across divisions and
what role cross-divisional synergies play in ar-
riving at matches or mismatches between
knowledge requirements and capabilities.
Future research may also examine the link-
ages between investing in knowledge acquisi-
tion and transfer capabilities and the creation of
new knowledge. For example, through knowl-
edge acquisition and transfer, organizations can
combine or refine existing knowledge (Argote,
1999) or can create new applications for existing
knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Smith, Col-
lins, & Clark, 2005). Likewise, creative new in-
sights and ideas may be developed when ac-
quired knowledge is combined with existing
knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). We have
focused on investments in knowledge capabili-
ties to respond to an organization’s need to re-
solve uncertainty and equivocality instilled by
the knowledge requirements it faces. However,
through developing these knowledge capabili-
ties, new knowledge may be created that alters
the firm’s situation or future knowledge require-
ments (Daft & Weick, 1984). A promising area of
future research is to examine the nature of these
linkages among knowledge acquisition, transfer
and creation, and knowledge requirements.
In conclusion, viewing organizations as
knowledge-dependent interpretation systems
helps clarify why knowledge investments are
likely to vary widely across organizations and
when they will have positive or negative effects
on value creation. Some organizations may in-
vest more than others because they face more
intense knowledge requirements and would
benefit from knowing more. Other organizations
may invest more because they hold rosy views
of knowledge investments. Both research and
practice will benefit from understanding the
conditions under which organizations need
knowledge, as well as the forces that may con-
tribute to under- or overinvestment in knowledge.
In essence, we challenge the implicit assump-
tion in much extant research (prominent excep-
tions are Haas & Hansen, 2005, and Kor & Leb-
lebici, 2005) and practice that more knowledge is
always better. Instead, our theorizing suggests
it would be more prudent for organizations to
manage their knowledge investments carefully
in response to the knowledge requirements they
face. If knowledge is central to understanding
why organizations exist (Conner & Prahalad,
1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1993), then furthering
our understanding of why some organizations
make certain types of knowledge investments
more than others and when these investments
lead to value creation is a useful aim. We hope
our model helps organize the discourse and re-
search needed in answering this important
question.
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